Version 1.7.02026-10-18Design revision 7

The orchestrator's earnings

Runs: Run 9

Show
Changes the explanations on this page: the passages, and what opens when you press +. Headlines and pictures stay the same. Your choice stays as you move between pages.
Show
No replayThere is no recorded replay of this version; 2.7.0 is the one version with one. The results below are the study's own tables.

What the orchestrator's own inspectors earn now goes to the orchestrator, which pays its bills from it.

01

What went wrong

The orchestrator's own inspectors' earnings went to market inspectors, while the orchestrator ran up debts.

orchestrator's inspector earned 6,200 to 6,800 a run market inspectors, as a bonus
Bad outcome: The orchestrator paid late-request refunds on about 2 a step, then owed 20,000 to 26,000

Baruchi asked why an inspector should profit from something the orchestrator's own inspectors did. Under the old rules, what the orchestrator's own inspectors earned, 6,200 to 6,800 a run with 60 percent stampers, was handed to the market's inspectors as a bonus. Meanwhile the orchestrator paid the refunds for late requests out of an income of about 2 a step. With 50 to 60 percent stampers it ended near zero, owing 20,000 to 26,000, with test cases unpaid. The record calls this money in the wrong pocket. Run 8 had also shown that letting two thirds of the inspectors be on duty tripled the unpaid test cases, from 81 to 272, because the orchestrator's inspectors did more work from the same money.

Baruchi's question named this revision: why should an inspector profit from something a troop (one of the orchestrator's own inspectors) did? Under 1.6.0 the troops' net at 60% stampers, 6,200–6,800 a run, went to the market's reviewers as uplift, by a 1.4.0 clause that nothing a troop earns reaches the orchestrator. The same orchestrator paid the lateness rebates from about 2 a tick of income and ended near zero at 50–60% stampers, with liabilities of 20,000–26,000 and plants (its own test cases) unfunded. The record's phrase: the money was in the wrong pocket. Run 8 also showed that the two-thirds duty cap, which fixed lateness at 60% stampers, tripled plants unfunded (81 to 272), because the orchestrator delivered more from the same purse.

The seventh use of §19's path, and the one Baruchi named: why should an inspector profit from something a troop did? from their perspective it's just like any other actor in the system. Run 8's finding (above) was that the panel rule is the honesty gain and Ω's backing the capacity gain, and that the clock's liability is a stock the orchestrator cannot pay down — the troops' net at 60/40, 6,200–6,800 a run, went to the market's reviewers as uplift by 1.4.0's clause that nothing a troop earns reaches Ω, while the same Ω carried the rebates on about 2 a tick and ended near zero at 50–60% with liabilities of 20,000–26,000 and plants unfunded.

Source: HANDOFF.md l.1384–1389

The money was in the wrong pocket: the troops' net at 60/40 was 6,200–6,800 a run (the fund's uplift paid plus its closing balance less the surcharge received), and 1.4.0 §2.4 sent it to the market's reviewers as uplift by the clause that nothing a troop earns reaches Ω\Omega, while the same Ω\Omega carried the rebates for the lateness those troops were summoned to prevent. The two-thirds cap at 60/40 halved the queue (94 → 44), lifted on-time from 0.60 to 0.90, cut mean lateness 38 → 8 and the liability 19,778 → 3,512 with false approvals unchanged and careful wealth within 3% — and, a figure the run-8 notes had not reported, tripled plants unfunded (81 → 272), because the state delivered more from the same Ω\Omega.

Source: spec/agentic_economics_loop_spec_v2_9_0.md l.1272–1272

02

What changed

Two accounts: the bonus fund takes only the raised tax; the earnings of its own inspectors above a reserve reach the orchestrator.

raised tax bonus fund all paid out inspector
orchestrator's inspector earnings troop account above a reserve orchestrator
Yes: The orchestrator pays its debts from its income

The orchestrator's own inspectors now count as part of the orchestrator: what they earn is the orchestrator's, and its bills are paid from it. There are two accounts again. The bonus fund for inspectors takes in only the raised tax, and pays all of it out. A separate account holds the money of the orchestrator's own inspectors, and what it holds above a reserve flows to the orchestrator. The orchestrator pays its debts from its income. The limit on inspectors on duty became two thirds. The orchestrator's fee rate, which the record calls the take, was tried at 5, 10 and 15 percent.

Design revision 7 makes a troop an actor of the orchestrator: what it earns is the orchestrator's, and the orchestrator's bills are paid from it. The money is split into two accounts again. The duty fund takes in only the raised tax and pays its whole balance out as uplift at every batch. A separate troop account takes the orchestrator's advances and every troop's earnings, pays the troops' costs, and at each batch sends its unlocked balance above a reserve to the orchestrator. The orchestrator pays its debts from that income, in the order 1.6.0 set. The reserve is now just the capital the troops hold, the members' duty cap becomes two thirds, and the take (the orchestrator's fee rate) was swept at 5, 10 and 15%. The orchestrator's income is now recorded by source.

A troop is an actor of the state; what it earns is the state's, and the state's bills are paid from it. (1.7.0)

Source: spec/agentic_economics_loop_spec_v2_9_0.md l.32–32

The rules (§4.1, §10.4, §12.1, §12.2, §12.3, I23). Two accounts again: the duty fund is 1.3.0's uplift fund — the raised tax in and nothing else, its whole balance out as uplift at every batch, no reserve, no lock; the troops' wallet is a separate troop account — Ω's advances and every troop's earnings in; costs, locks, forfeits, burns, repayments out; at each batch the unlocked balance above R_T flows to Ω. The clause withdrawn: a troop is an actor of the state and its earnings are the state's; the guards that stand in its place (members first at every seat, the windows, cost at summons, no emission/uplift/ρ/κ to a troop, the state's share public) plus one reading, Ω's income by source. R_T is capital held: the two-period peak of costs purchased plus locks, every troop in the field; the 1.5.0 refused component withdrawn (its reason went with A_T); its purpose now the troops' in-flight capacity shielded from the liability queue. Ω pays its debts from its income: the 1.6.0 order unchanged and funded; the plant reserve's horizon ruled a plant's life. The cap ⌈2E_t/3⌉. ω₀ swept {5, 10, 15}% with r_s pinned at 1.

Source: HANDOFF.md l.1399–1408

03

What the runs found

At 60 to 80% stampers the orchestrator stayed solvent and on time; at 50% the market collapsed.

Good outcome: Both changes at 60% stampers, then debt 317, the orchestrator kept 4,352
Bad outcome: 50% stampers, then 609 requests waiting, debt 20,643
Bad outcome: One free member blocks sending troops that step, then blocked on 79% of steps, 289 waiting
The orchestrator's liability, one factor at a time, 60/40
credits
1.6.0 control19,778accounts alone16,694cap alone3,512both (1.7.0)317

60% stampers, 20 seeds per cell, read from the second period on. Source: agentic_sim/results/studies/1.7.0-earnings-notes-for-reviewer.md l.11–16

Plants unfunded, one factor at a time, 60/40
plants
1.6.0 control81accounts alone124cap alone272both (1.7.0)0.7

Test cases the orchestrator could not fund; meant to be zero. Source: agentic_sim/results/studies/1.7.0-earnings-notes-for-reviewer.md l.11–16

The orchestrator's liability by stamper share, 1.7.0 against the 1.6.0 two-thirds control
credits
1.7.01.6.0 two-thirds control
50% stampers20,64318,67560% stampers3173,51270% stampers077680% stampers2261,409

Solvent from 60% up; at 50% the market collapses. Source: agentic_sim/results/studies/1.7.0-earnings-notes-for-reviewer.md l.22–27

With 60 percent stampers, the two changes together did what the plan predicted: unpaid test cases were zero in 17 of 20 seeds, the debt was a few hundred, and the orchestrator kept more than 4,000. The new accounts on their own were worse than before: old debts took the orchestrator's income, it could not send its own inspectors, and the next period was later still. With 60 to 80 percent stampers the orchestrator stayed solvent and on time. Careful inspectors were 12 to 25 percent poorer than before, and still five to six times richer than a stamper. With 50 percent stampers the market collapsed: 609 requests waiting, a quarter of them on time, and a debt of 20,643. A take of 10 percent cleared everything at 60 percent stampers, but no take tried cleared 50 percent. A follow-up traced the collapse. The rule was read so that one free member of the market blocked every request from going to the orchestrator's own inspectors on that step. With 50 percent stampers that happened on 79 percent of steps, while 289 requests waited. The work then came in bursts, and the line grew between them. In the record's words, the collapse is the stall.

Run 9 was 520 runs, 20 seeds per cell, 20 actors, every final audit passed. At 60% stampers the two changes together did what Hypothesis 1 said: plants unfunded zero in 17 of 20 seeds, the liability a few hundred, the orchestrator above 4,000 through the last period. The accounts alone were worse than the control: with the half cap, lateness accrued, the debts took the orchestrator's income, the orchestrator could not summon, and the next period was later still. The record's conclusion: the cap is what keeps that loop from closing.

From 60 to 80% stampers the system was solvent and on time, with the orchestrator's share of deliveries unchanged within noise. The honest were 12–25% poorer than under the control, as the uplift fell by two fifths to a half, and five to six times richer than a stamper; false approvals stayed close to the control's (11 / 14 / 14 / 16 against 13 / 13 / 14 / 17). At 50% stampers the market collapsed: a queue of 609 against the control's 129, an on-time share of 0.25, a liability of 20,643. A take of 10% cleared everything at 60% stampers; at 50% no take swept carried the clock.

An addendum traced the 50% collapse. The engine read the summons rule per tick: one free member blocked every award summons that tick. At 50% stampers the orchestrator was blocked on 79% of ticks with 289 requests waiting; summonses came in bursts when no member happened to be free, and between bursts the queue grew about a request a tick. The record's reading: the collapse is the stall, and the two accounts decide how the bursts are financed. Changing how long a suspended stamper waits before it returns on probation (0, 50 or 100 ticks) repaired neither split.

520 runs, 20 seeds per cell, 20 actors, every final audit passed, engine 003a238.

Source: HANDOFF.md l.1441–1441

cell plants unfunded Ω's liability Ω at the end (min, last period) on-time share (2nd period on) queue reviews unassigned troop deliveries award summonses refused (case-ticks) troop surplus to Ω careful wealth (uplift) FA (probationers')
1.6.0 control (merged fund, half cap) 81 19,778 94 (48) 0.47 94 7,746 1,353 13,049 — 4,956 (1,291) 13 (3.7)
accounts alone (half cap) 124 16,694 347 (314) 0.28 718 3,534 560 33,638 3,575 4,239 (528) 13 (3.7)
cap alone (merged fund) 272 3,512 47 (28) 0.83 44 3,424 1,723 1,979 — 4,808 (1,367) 13 (3.4)
both (1.7.0) 0.7 317 4,352 (4,010) 0.89 42 3,449 1,719 607 6,029 4,250 (795) 14 (3.1)

Source: agentic_sim/results/studies/1.7.0-earnings-notes-for-reviewer.md l.11–16

Both together do what Hypothesis 1 says: plants unfunded zero in 17 of 20 seeds (2, 4 and 8 in three; one seed tipped), the liability a few hundred, Ω above 4,000 through the last period. The accounts alone are worse than the control: under the merged fund the troops were financed by the surcharge whatever Ω owed; under the two accounts every summons beyond the capital held is Ω's advance, and Ω pays debts older than a period first — once the half cap lets lateness accrue, the debts take Ω's income, the state cannot summon, and the next period is later still. R_T as capital held (461) shields the in-flight cohort and nothing more; the cap is what keeps the loop from closing.

Source: HANDOFF.md l.1449–1455

stampers plants unfunded Ω's liability Ω at the end on-time (2+) lateness queue troop deliveries (refused case-ticks) troop surplus / fee income careful wealth (uplift) stampers FA lag kind
50% 138 (159) 20,643 (18,675) 59 (56) 0.25 (0.42) 90 (30) 609 (129) 500 (23,497) vs 1,169 (8,377) 2,743 / 2,418 4,056 (484) vs 4,432 (1,006) 611 (681) 11 (13) 0
60% 0.7 (272) 317 (3,512) 4,352 (47) 0.89 (0.83) 6.8 (8.3) 42 (44) 1,719 (607) vs 1,723 (1,979) 6,029 / 2,993 4,250 (795) vs 4,808 (1,367) 651 (715) 14 (13) 0.05
70% 0.1 (19) 0 (776) 7,967 (856) 0.97 (0.95) 4.0 (5.2) 41 (41) 1,859 (95) vs 1,861 (648) 7,191 / 2,996 4,659 (1,054) vs 5,653 (2,038) 736 (804) 14 (14) 0
80% 3.6 (1.0) 226 (1,409) 9,215 (1,135) 0.95 (0.93) 5.0 (7.0) 40 (40) 2,132 (1,642) vs 2,075 (1,714) 8,528 / 2,996 5,190 (1,539) vs 6,881 (3,231) 810 (955) 16 (17) 0

Source: agentic_sim/results/studies/1.7.0-earnings-notes-for-reviewer.md l.22–27

Tipping (1.7.0 against the 1.6.0 two-thirds control): at 60–80% solvent and on time — liability 317 / 0 / 226, Ω 4,352 / 7,967 / 9,215, plants unfunded 0.7 / 0.1 / 3.6, on-time 0.89 / 0.97 / 0.95 — with the state's share unchanged within noise (1,719 vs 1,723; 1,859 vs 1,861; 2,132 vs 2,075) while refusals fall (Hypothesis 3 holds as the rc.2 review framed it); the honest 12 / 18 / 25% poorer (uplift down two fifths to a half) and five to six times richer than a stamper (Hypothesis 4); false approvals 11 / 14 / 14 / 16 against 13 / 13 / 14 / 17, the lag kind zero. At 50/50 the market collapses — queue 609 (control 129), the state delivering 500 against 1,169, on-time 0.25, liability 20,643 — by the same mechanism

Source: HANDOFF.md l.1457–1463

The take: at 60/40, 10% clears everything — liability 0, plants unfunded 0, Ω 7,836, careful wealth 5,066 (above the control: the surcharge doubles too); at 50/50 fees do not carry the clock at any take swept (liability 20,643 / 13,169 / 7,637, queue 609 / 342 / 178 at 5 / 10 / 15%).

Source: HANDOFF.md l.1469–1471

The engine reads 1.4.0 §12.3's "no member free to commit" per tick — one free member blocks every award summons that tick — so at 50/50 the state is blocked on 79% of ticks with 289 requests waiting and 2.0 members free (60/40: 54%, 14 waiting, 1.5 free, but the members are all committed often enough that the state summons 21 deliveries per 10 ticks); the summonses come in bursts when none is free (the first at tick 288, 38 at once; 70% of all troop deliveries in bursts of twenty or more), the queue grows a request a tick between them, and the queue's age is the lateness.

Source: HANDOFF.md l.1493–1498

The collapse is the stall; the two accounts decide how the bursts are financed.

Source: HANDOFF.md l.1503–1504

(2) T_susp ∈ {0, 50, 100}. At 0 a suspended stamper is a probationer at the next rotation (460–570 suspensions a run);

Source: HANDOFF.md l.1506–1507

Tsusp∈{0,50,100}T_{\text{susp}}\in\{0,50,100\} moved who is free and repaired neither split; honesty paid for lowering it at both.

Source: spec/agentic_economics_loop_spec_v2_9_0.md l.1286–1286

04

Conclusion

The test for sending the orchestrator's own inspectors is the item to decide first.

Yes: Decide first: when the orchestrator may send its own inspectors
No: Careful inspectors 12 to 25% poorer: left for Baruchi to decide

The record makes the test for sending the orchestrator's own inspectors the item to decide first. It also leaves open that the careful inspectors are 12 to 25 percent poorer, which is Baruchi's call.

The record's item for the decision is the summons test itself, before the troops' working capital or a protocol for requests the market cannot serve. Other items left open: the take at 10% if plants unfunded must be zero in every seed, a liability stock that never clears once the market is honest, and the honest 12–25% poorer, which is Baruchi's call.

For the next decision, in order: (1) the troops' working capital at 50/50 — advances before old debts under stress, or a working-capital target above R_T, or the cannot-serve protocol that bounds the debt at the source (the take does not do it: 15% at 50/50 leaves 7,600 owed); (2) the take at 60/40 as 10% if plants unfunded must be exactly zero in every seed; (3) the liability stock that never clears once honest; (4) the honest 12–25% poorer — Baruchi's call; (5) drift at m_max 2, false approvals 80 against 64, read with Q14 first.

Source: HANDOFF.md l.1481–1485

No value is right at both splits and none repairs 50/50; the lever is the same one the stall reads the other way. The item for the decision is the summons test, before the working capital or the protocol.

Source: HANDOFF.md l.1512–1514