With 60 percent stampers, the two changes together did what the plan predicted: unpaid test cases were zero in 17 of 20 seeds, the debt was a few hundred, and the orchestrator kept more than 4,000.
The new accounts on their own were worse than before: old debts took the orchestrator's income, it could not send its own inspectors, and the next period was later still.
With 60 to 80 percent stampers the orchestrator stayed solvent and on time.
Careful inspectors were 12 to 25 percent poorer than before, and still five to six times richer than a stamper.
With 50 percent stampers the market collapsed: 609 requests waiting, a quarter of them on time, and a debt of 20,643.
A take of 10 percent cleared everything at 60 percent stampers, but no take tried cleared 50 percent.
A follow-up traced the collapse.
The rule was read so that one free member of the market blocked every request from going to the orchestrator's own inspectors on that step.
With 50 percent stampers that happened on 79 percent of steps, while 289 requests waited.
The work then came in bursts, and the line grew between them.
In the record's words, the collapse is the stall.
Run 9 was 520 runs, 20 seeds per cell, 20 actors, every final audit passed. At 60% stampers the two changes together did what Hypothesis 1 said: plants unfunded zero in 17 of 20 seeds, the liability a few hundred, the orchestrator above 4,000 through the last period. The accounts alone were worse than the control: with the half cap, lateness accrued, the debts took the orchestrator's income, the orchestrator could not summon, and the next period was later still. The record's conclusion: the cap is what keeps that loop from closing.
From 60 to 80% stampers the system was solvent and on time, with the orchestrator's share of deliveries unchanged within noise. The honest were 12–25% poorer than under the control, as the uplift fell by two fifths to a half, and five to six times richer than a stamper; false approvals stayed close to the control's (11 / 14 / 14 / 16 against 13 / 13 / 14 / 17). At 50% stampers the market collapsed: a queue of 609 against the control's 129, an on-time share of 0.25, a liability of 20,643. A take of 10% cleared everything at 60% stampers; at 50% no take swept carried the clock.
An addendum traced the 50% collapse. The engine read the summons rule per tick: one free member blocked every award summons that tick. At 50% stampers the orchestrator was blocked on 79% of ticks with 289 requests waiting; summonses came in bursts when no member happened to be free, and between bursts the queue grew about a request a tick. The record's reading: the collapse is the stall, and the two accounts decide how the bursts are financed. Changing how long a suspended stamper waits before it returns on probation (0, 50 or 100 ticks) repaired neither split.
520 runs, 20 seeds per cell, 20 actors, every final audit passed, engine 003a238.
Source: HANDOFF.md l.1441–1441
| cell |
plants unfunded |
Ω's liability |
Ω at the end (min, last period) |
on-time share (2nd period on) |
queue |
reviews unassigned |
troop deliveries |
award summonses refused (case-ticks) |
troop surplus to Ω |
careful wealth (uplift) |
FA (probationers') |
| 1.6.0 control (merged fund, half cap) |
81 |
19,778 |
94 (48) |
0.47 |
94 |
7,746 |
1,353 |
13,049 |
— |
4,956 (1,291) |
13 (3.7) |
| accounts alone (half cap) |
124 |
16,694 |
347 (314) |
0.28 |
718 |
3,534 |
560 |
33,638 |
3,575 |
4,239 (528) |
13 (3.7) |
| cap alone (merged fund) |
272 |
3,512 |
47 (28) |
0.83 |
44 |
3,424 |
1,723 |
1,979 |
— |
4,808 (1,367) |
13 (3.4) |
| both (1.7.0) |
0.7 |
317 |
4,352 (4,010) |
0.89 |
42 |
3,449 |
1,719 |
607 |
6,029 |
4,250 (795) |
14 (3.1) |
Source: agentic_sim/results/studies/1.7.0-earnings-notes-for-reviewer.md l.11–16
Both together do what Hypothesis 1 says: plants unfunded zero in 17 of 20 seeds (2, 4 and 8 in three; one seed tipped), the liability a few hundred, Ω above 4,000 through the last period. The accounts alone are worse than the control: under the merged fund the troops were financed by the surcharge whatever Ω owed; under the two accounts every summons beyond the capital held is Ω's advance, and Ω pays debts older than a period first — once the half cap lets lateness accrue, the debts take Ω's income, the state cannot summon, and the next period is later still. R_T as capital held (461) shields the in-flight cohort and nothing more; the cap is what keeps the loop from closing.
Source: HANDOFF.md l.1449–1455
| stampers |
plants unfunded |
Ω's liability |
Ω at the end |
on-time (2+) |
lateness |
queue |
troop deliveries (refused case-ticks) |
troop surplus / fee income |
careful wealth (uplift) |
stampers |
FA |
lag kind |
| 50% |
138 (159) |
20,643 (18,675) |
59 (56) |
0.25 (0.42) |
90 (30) |
609 (129) |
500 (23,497) vs 1,169 (8,377) |
2,743 / 2,418 |
4,056 (484) vs 4,432 (1,006) |
611 (681) |
11 (13) |
0 |
| 60% |
0.7 (272) |
317 (3,512) |
4,352 (47) |
0.89 (0.83) |
6.8 (8.3) |
42 (44) |
1,719 (607) vs 1,723 (1,979) |
6,029 / 2,993 |
4,250 (795) vs 4,808 (1,367) |
651 (715) |
14 (13) |
0.05 |
| 70% |
0.1 (19) |
0 (776) |
7,967 (856) |
0.97 (0.95) |
4.0 (5.2) |
41 (41) |
1,859 (95) vs 1,861 (648) |
7,191 / 2,996 |
4,659 (1,054) vs 5,653 (2,038) |
736 (804) |
14 (14) |
0 |
| 80% |
3.6 (1.0) |
226 (1,409) |
9,215 (1,135) |
0.95 (0.93) |
5.0 (7.0) |
40 (40) |
2,132 (1,642) vs 2,075 (1,714) |
8,528 / 2,996 |
5,190 (1,539) vs 6,881 (3,231) |
810 (955) |
16 (17) |
0 |
Source: agentic_sim/results/studies/1.7.0-earnings-notes-for-reviewer.md l.22–27
Tipping (1.7.0 against the 1.6.0 two-thirds control): at 60–80% solvent and on time — liability 317 / 0 / 226, Ω 4,352 / 7,967 / 9,215, plants unfunded 0.7 / 0.1 / 3.6, on-time 0.89 / 0.97 / 0.95 — with the state's share unchanged within noise (1,719 vs 1,723; 1,859 vs 1,861; 2,132 vs 2,075) while refusals fall (Hypothesis 3 holds as the rc.2 review framed it); the honest 12 / 18 / 25% poorer (uplift down two fifths to a half) and five to six times richer than a stamper (Hypothesis 4); false approvals 11 / 14 / 14 / 16 against 13 / 13 / 14 / 17, the lag kind zero. At 50/50 the market collapses — queue 609 (control 129), the state delivering 500 against 1,169, on-time 0.25, liability 20,643 — by the same mechanism
Source: HANDOFF.md l.1457–1463
The take: at 60/40, 10% clears everything — liability 0, plants unfunded 0, Ω 7,836, careful wealth 5,066 (above the control: the surcharge doubles too); at 50/50 fees do not carry the clock at any take swept (liability 20,643 / 13,169 / 7,637, queue 609 / 342 / 178 at 5 / 10 / 15%).
Source: HANDOFF.md l.1469–1471
The engine reads 1.4.0 §12.3's "no member free to commit" per tick — one free member blocks every award summons that tick — so at 50/50 the state is blocked on 79% of ticks with 289 requests waiting and 2.0 members free (60/40: 54%, 14 waiting, 1.5 free, but the members are all committed often enough that the state summons 21 deliveries per 10 ticks); the summonses come in bursts when none is free (the first at tick 288, 38 at once; 70% of all troop deliveries in bursts of twenty or more), the queue grows a request a tick between them, and the queue's age is the lateness.
Source: HANDOFF.md l.1493–1498
The collapse is the stall; the two accounts decide how the bursts are financed.
Source: HANDOFF.md l.1503–1504
(2) T_susp ∈ {0, 50, 100}. At 0 a suspended stamper is a probationer at the next rotation (460–570 suspensions a run);
Source: HANDOFF.md l.1506–1507
Tsusp∈{0,50,100} moved who is free and repaired neither split; honesty paid for lowering it at both.
Source: spec/agentic_economics_loop_spec_v2_9_0.md l.1286–1286